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Congressional documents reveal the Trump administration’s draft nuclear cooperation deal with Riyadh includes provisions for uranium enrichment — a departure from the regional nonproliferation model that could accelerate a Middle Eastern arms race.
Saudi Arabia appears poised to obtain uranium enrichment capabilities under a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, according to congressional documents reviewed by the Arms Control Association and confirmed by the Associated Press. The revelation arrives at a particularly volatile moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics, with US-Iran nuclear talks resuming in Geneva and Riyadh’s newly formalized defense pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan already redrawing the region’s security architecture.
What the Draft Agreement Contains
The proposed deal, pursued by both the Trump and Biden administrations, would establish bilateral safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering what the documents describe as the “most proliferation-sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation.” Those areas explicitly include uranium enrichment, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing — all processes with direct weapons applications. Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, warned that once IAEA safeguards are in place, the agreement would open the door for Saudi Arabia to acquire enrichment technology, potentially from the United States itself. The Trump administration’s broader nuclear strategy envisions 20 commercial nuclear deals worldwide, with the Saudi arrangement alone valued at several billion dollars.
The Gold Standard in Ruins
The proposed terms represent a stark departure from the precedent set by the neighboring United Arab Emirates. When Abu Dhabi built its Barakah nuclear power plant with South Korean assistance under a US “123 agreement,” it explicitly renounced enrichment and reprocessing capabilities — a model that nonproliferation experts long upheld as the gold standard for civilian nuclear cooperation. Granting Riyadh rights that were denied to Abu Dhabi risks undermining the nonproliferation framework that Washington itself championed across the Gulf. The congressional document justifies the shift by arguing that nuclear cooperation would advance US national security interests and help American industry compete with China, France, and Russia in the global nuclear technology market.
The Pakistan Factor
Proliferation concerns are amplified by Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan, signed on September 17, 2025, at Al-Yamamah Palace in Riyadh. The pact — the first of its kind between an Arab Gulf state and a nuclear-armed nation — stipulates that any aggression against one country constitutes aggression against both. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif initially stated that his country’s nuclear program would be “made available” to Saudi Arabia if needed, though he later retracted the comment. The deliberate ambiguity has nevertheless reshaped regional threat calculations. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself previously declared that Saudi Arabia’s growing strategic ambitions extend to the nuclear domain, stating he would pursue weapons if Iran obtained them.
Iran Talks Add Urgency
The timing is particularly sensitive given the ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations. Talks mediated by Oman resumed in Geneva on February 18, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reporting progress toward “guiding principles” for a potential agreement. Bloomberg reported on February 21 that Washington has effectively accepted Tehran’s position on continuing uranium enrichment, with negotiations now focused on technical parameters such as centrifuge numbers and enrichment levels rather than a complete halt. Iran currently holds approximately 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity — a short technical step from the 90 percent weapons-grade threshold. If Washington simultaneously allows Saudi enrichment while negotiating limits on Iran’s program, the contradiction could undermine both diplomatic tracks. The Trump administration’s broader foreign policy approach has already drawn scrutiny for prioritizing commercial interests over established institutional frameworks.
What Comes Next
The proposed deal still requires congressional review under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, and bipartisan opposition is likely. Critics argue that granting enrichment rights to a kingdom that has shown little interest in democratic accountability — and that maintains a defense alliance with a nuclear-armed state — sets a dangerous precedent for every aspiring nuclear nation. The Arms Control Association has explicitly warned that the administration may not have fully weighed the proliferation risks or the signal this agreement sends globally. For the Middle East, the calculus is straightforward: if Saudi Arabia enriches uranium, the incentive for other regional powers to seek similar capabilities only grows, potentially triggering the very arms race that decades of nonproliferation diplomacy sought to prevent.
Sources: Saudi Gazette, Abcnews, Apnews
